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1Introduction
In most, if not all, Western countries participation in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security
system does not seem attractive for the current younger generations. The expected rate of return
on social security contributions is considerably lower than the expected rate of return on ﬁnancial
investments. Lower and even negative population growth only aggravates the burden that a PAYG
system imposes on younger generations. This has stimulated a considerable interest in a social
security reform in which the PAYG system would be replaced, at least partially, by a funded
component taking advantage of a higher market rate of return.1
In the absence of altruism such a reform creates an intergenerational conﬂict. Although future
generations beneﬁt from a transition to a fully-funded system, existing pensioners would have to
accept reductions in their beneﬁts unless they receive compensation ﬁnanced by the beneﬁciary
future generations. Establishing such an intergenerational transfer institution is diﬃcult even
from a theoretical perspective. A natural but in this respect ineﬀective compensating transfer
institution is public debt. If the PAYG system is free from ineﬃciencies not related to the inherent
intergenerational redistribution2, the gains of future generations are neutralized by higher future
taxation needed to service public debt (Fenge, 1995 and Brunner, 1996 ).3
In this paper, we introduce a diﬀerent intergenerational transfer institution through which the
elderly participate in the future eﬃciency gains created by a decrease in the PAYG tax rate. This
mechanism consists of voluntary market transactions in the ﬁxed factor, labeled here as land for
1Most prominently, Feldstein (1996) advocates replacing a PAYG system by a funded one based on this argument.
In contrast, see Diamond (1996) for a critical evaluation of the rate-of-return argument in restructuring social
security.
2Intragenerational redistribution is part of the social security system in many countries, but the implied ineﬃ-
ciencies cannot be attributed to the existence of a PAYG system which inherently only induces intergenerational
redistribution.
3The Pareto-eﬃciency of the PAYG system was ﬁrst demonstrated in Breyer (1989) and Verbon (1989). In
contrast to Fenge and Brunner, Breyer and Verbon assume an exogenous labor supply and a PAYG system with
lump-sum contributions and pension beneﬁts.
1convenience.4 The presence of land has two implications in our model. First, the economy is
dynamically eﬃcient, i.e. the interest rate exceeds the output growth rate (Homburg, 1991 and
Rhee, 1991). As the output growth rate is the rate of return on PAYG contributions, the PAYG
system is ﬁscally unattractive for future generations. Second, the part of the future eﬃciency gains
which improves land productivity is immediately capitalized in its current market value. Both
implications form the basis for the contribution of this paper: If suﬃciently high, the reform-
induced increase in land value outweighs the loss from cutting social security beneﬁts for the old
land owners. The PAYG reform thus provides a welfare improvement for all generations alive and
for generations to be born into all future periods.
We also suggest alternative reasons for why a currently ineﬃcient social security system was
installed in the ﬁrst place. Typically, social security systems were introduced and expanded in
the 19th century and early 20th century, when other public expenditures were much smaller.
Our analysis suggests that an increase in the wage tax rate collected to ﬁnance other public
expenditures could alone render a social security system, which initially beneﬁted the elderly,
so costly that currently even they might beneﬁt from its partial or even full dismantling. In
addition, changes in the demographics, productivity growth or interest rates may render a system
unattractive even for the elderly, who at least previously had supported it.
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which each cohort lives for three periods.
During the ﬁrst period of life, the members of the cohort invest privately in education. In the
4Evaluating the quantitative importance of the ﬁxed factor, Laitner (2000) calculates the ratio of non-
reproducible capital (which approximates the capitalized value of inelastically supplied factors) to reproducible
capital in the U.S. This centers around 15-25 percent over the second half of the 20th century. The stake that
private households have in the productivity changes of these ﬁxed factors appears to have increased due to at
least two dramatic changes in U.S. retirement saving during the last two decades. These are the transition from
deﬁned beneﬁt plans to deﬁned contribution plans, and the associated huge increase in the value of pension assets.
Poterba et al. (2001) report that 59 percent of private retirement savings in 1980 were in employer-based deﬁned
beneﬁt plans, while currently 85 percent are deﬁned contribution plans in which individuals decide on the level and
investment of their contributions. At the same time, the ratio of all private retirement assets to wage and salary
earnings quadrupled.
2second period of life, they supply labor services equal to their human capital to production and
purchase land from the older generation. Social security contributions are collected. During the
third period of life, they receive social security beneﬁts (indexed to past contributions) as retirees,
land rents as land owners, and sell the land to the next generation.
In addition to the presence of the capitalization eﬀect as a compensation mechanism, our model
diﬀers from the existing literature on social security reform in several important respects. First of
all, we prove the possibility of a Pareto-improvement in case where there is only intergenerational
redistribution through social security.5 Identical for all individuals, pension beneﬁts are a constant
fraction of former contributions.6 Secondly, there are neither externalities, distortions arising from
early retirement provisions, nor labour market imperfections in our model. These distortions, or
intragenerational redistribution, are critical sources of welfare gains in existing literature.7 In that
respect, we adopt a framework in which the existence of a Pareto-improving pension reform has
not yet been proven. Thirdly, according to earlier literature opening the economy is found to be
detrimental for the domestic welfare gains of a social security reform. An increase in private savings
following a reduction in the PAYG pension pillar is distributed worldwide via the international
5Any existing PAYG system can be divided into two parts; one implementing intergenerational redistribution
and the other intragenerational redistribution. We analyze a system which redistributes only intergenerationally
since this part is inherently related to a PAYG system. Ineﬃciencies in the intragenerational tax-transfer scheme
can be addressed without aﬀecting the “core” of the PAYG system, namely intergenerational redistribution.
6This corresponds to social security systems in Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and Portugal, in which the
diﬀerence in the gross replacement rate between high-income and low-income earners is at most 3 percentage points.
In the U.S., the gross replacement rate decreases from 71 percent for those with a ﬁnal salary of $20,000 to 45
percent for those with a ﬁnal salary of $50,000 (Miles and Timmermann 1999).
7Homburg (1990), Feldstein and Samwick (1998), Kotlikoﬀ (1998), and Cooley and Soares (1999b) suggest a
Pareto-improving reform analyzing a PAYG system which allows for intragenerational redistribution. Their analy-
sis is consistent with the theoretical result in Fenge (1995) since the simulated PAYG systems do not exhibit
intragenerational fairness. In this case pension beneﬁts are only loosely linked to contributions, making the system
highly distortionary. Belan et al. (1998), Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbe (1997), Belan and Pestieau (1999), Pember-
ton (2000), and Gyárfás and Marquardt (2001) each identify a reform which relies on positive externalities from
physical capital. Such externalities can be addressed by a savings subsidy without reforming the social security
system (Sinn, 2000). Analogously, eﬃcient retirement decisions can separately be achieved by eliminating incen-
tives pushing for early retirement (Cremer and Pestieau, 2003). Pension reform in the presence of imperfect labour
markets is considered in Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000). Besides a reduction in unemployment the eﬃciency gains
of the reform originate from intragenerational redistribution. Related to our paper, reform induced windfall proﬁts
accrue to pensioners due to a re-evaluation of existing physical capital.
3capital market while in a closed economy it solely translates into a higher capital stock (Pemberton,
2000). Assuming a small open economy, in which capital accumulation is unaﬀected by a reform-
induced increase in domestic savings, we show that incentives to reform the PAYG system may
still exist.
Related literature includes Laitner (2000) who analyzes social security reform when future
productivity gains are incorporated into stock prices. Firms have two assets: reproducible physical
capital and capitalized value of patents. Contrary to our analysis, Laitner does not consider the
potential of a Pareto-improving transition. Since labor supply is ﬁxed and there is no human capital
formation, PAYG contributions and beneﬁts are lump-sum. In this framework, the PAYG system
is Pareto-eﬃcient, clearly leaving no scope for analyzing the feasibility of a Pareto-improving
social security reform; see Hange (2003) for a formal analysis. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1999) similarly
consider pension reform in an economy with land. Assuming inelastic labor supply, they analyze
the trade-oﬀ between the risk-sharing beneﬁt (due to incomplete capital and insurance markets)
and the negative eﬀects on capital accumulation of the PAYG system. They argue that steady
state generations are still better oﬀ when abolishing the PAYG system, leaving aside the transition
problem. However, as a caveat, even in the presence of perfect markets, which compensate for
incomplete risk-sharing under a fully-funded system, a Pareto-improvement for steady state and
transition generations cannot be obtained for the reasons given above.
Intergenerational trade in land has important implications for the political process. Due to
population aging, pensioners receive a larger representation in the political process which tends to
preserve a generous pension system rather than allowing for a restrictive pension reform (Boadway
and Wildasin, 1989). Cooley and Soares (1999a) show that the interests of the working generation
near retirement and pensioners are suﬃciently closely aligned which gives rise to a wide political
majority against privatization of social security. Hansson and Stuart (1989) even argue that
4social security is an implicit contract among living generations in which the old have veto power.
Pension reform thus requires an intergenerational consensus. We show that intergenerational
trade is one mechanism to moderate if not resolve intergenerational conﬂict among living non-
altruistic generations and, interestingly, to indirectly represent future generations’ interests in the
contemporary political process. Relatedly, Rangel (2002) emphasizes the potential of land to act
as a “voice” mechanism of future generations in the current political process. In his paper, land
taxation is critical for establishing a link across generations. In our paper, an intergenerational
consensus may arise even without land taxes.
Intergenerational trade aligns intergenerational interest not only with respect to social security
reform but also with respect to general public sector reforms. For instance, the mechanism could
equally be involved in tax policy reform which entails a reduction in the level of future taxation.
The induced capital gains on land value, non-distortively taxed away by the government, can
build a fund out of which the budget balance in each future period is restored.8 There are two
theoretical reasons why the intergenerational transfer mechanism is particularly applicable to
social security reform. Firstly, the mechanism is present without allowing the government access
to a wider range of tax instruments than wage taxation. If the asset ownership is distributed in
correspondence to beneﬁts there would be no need for the government to be able to unexpectedly
tax capital gains in order to compensate all pensioners. Secondly, the mechanism does not require
that the government is able to commit to maintaining a once-established fund in all future periods
(Ramsey tax planner), neither does it require “reputational” political mechanisms to be operative
in inﬁnite times in the absence of a commitment capacity. If however the ambitious assumptions
are met, the capitalization eﬀect in combination with capital gains taxation may also be applied
8We are indebted to Clemens Fuest and Pierre Pestieau for suggesting this wider applicability of the mechanism
we have identiﬁed.
5to tax policy reform. Finally, the presence of land also widens the scope for intergenerational
transfers to the younger generations. Applied to education policy, Poutvaara (2003) shows that
non-altruistic land owners may gain by providing public education to the young even when the
land owners cannot tax the young and when the latter face no credit constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the model of an economy with
pay-as-you-go social security. In Section II, we introduce social security reform and consider the
potential for Pareto-improvements. In Section III, we present possible explanations for the rise
and fall of the PAYG system. Section IV concludes.
IM o d e l
Production
Production in any given period t depends on the available technology and factors of production.
We assume that there are three factors of production: physical capital, human capital and land.
The amount of land is normalized to unity. Aggregate human and physical capital in the economy
in period t is denoted by Ht and Kt, respectively. There is no migration of human capital,
while physical capital is internationally mobile. Therefore, domestic capital stock need not equal
domestic aggregate saving. The production function is Cobb-Douglas with At reﬂecting the state






where 0 <α H,α K < 1 and αH + αK < 1. Without loss of generality, capital does not










6wt denotes the wage rate per unit of human capital in period t and r is the exogenous world
interest rate. The land rent in period t, Rt, is given as residual









where β, 0 <β<1, is the elasticity of human capital supply with respect to investment in
education. Individual human capital stock in period t depends on investment in education in the
former period, et−1. The marginal productivity of education is diminishing and the unit cost of
education is 1. The costs of education should be interpreted broadly in the sense that they might
also include the monetarized value of eﬀort cost. We do not consider opportunity costs explicitly,
as they are eﬀectively tax deductible with proportional taxation.9 The aggregate stock of human
capital is the product of the stock per worker, ht,a n dt h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r s ,Nt,
Ht = Ntht. (3)
We assume a constant population growth rate, so that the size of the cohort working in period t
is given by
Nt = N0(1 + n)
t, (4)
where n = 0 is the growth rate of the population per cohort. While our model could be solved
9This results as with proportional taxation opportunity costs of lost earnings are reduced by the same proportion
as beneﬁts of higher wages due to educational investment.
7also for n<0, we restrict attention to non-negative growth rates. Production depends also on
technology parameter
At = A0(1 + g)
t,
where g = 0 denotes technological progress. We assume identical individuals, extending the
results in the Appendix to the case of heterogeneous individuals. Furthermore, there is no uncer-
tainty.
Individuals can invest their savings in the international capital market or the national land
market. Foreigners do not invest in the national land market. Even with integrated capital mar-
kets, full domestic land ownership could be guaranteed by foreigners facing a small transaction
cost if they were to buy domestic land, whereas there would be no transaction cost in an inter-
national loan market. Transaction cost in foreign land acquisition might arise due to asymmetric
information on the part of investors (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996) which tends to play a dimin-
ished role in international loan markets.10 The economy produces a composite good, which is a
perfect substitute for that produced abroad. By arbitrage, land value in period t, Vt,i sg i v e nb y 11






(1 + r)i.( 6 )
10Even with the presence of transaction costs faced by foreigners, Eq. (5) would hold because a strict inequality
as any diﬀerence in the rate of return between the two assets would be eliminated by trade in land by domestic
citizens, ﬁnanced by international borrowing.
11Though economic agents have a ﬁnite horizon, speculative bubbles are not considered as a component of the
land price. Given the presence of a ﬁxed factor, the economy turns out to be dynamically eﬃcient which rules out
the existence of bubbles (Tirole, 1985).
8Figure 1: Timing of individual actions over the life-cycle.
Individual Maximization
We analyze an overlapping generations model in which each cohort lives for three periods. The
timing of individual actions, apart from consumption, saving and borrowing, is depicted in Figure
1. In the ﬁrst period of their life individuals choose their education. Human capital is supplied to
the labor market in the second period.12
The government collects social security contributions and wage taxes at a rate τs and τw,
respectively, and individuals receive a net-of-tax wage income, [1−(τs +τw)]wtht. Social security
contributions are used to ﬁnance beneﬁts for the current old generation whereas wage taxes ﬁnance
public consumption. The middle-aged generation invests its savings by buying land from the
older generation and by participating in the international ﬁnancial market. In the third period,
individuals receive social security beneﬁts. Formally, social security beneﬁts in period t +1 , bt+1,
depend on contributions made in period t, ct = τswtht, according to the formula
bt+1 =( 1+x)ct, (7)
where x is the rate of return on contributions.13 The rate of return provided by the PAYG
system x is exogenous for each individual, but endogenous for the economy as shown in the next
12What is essential is that eﬀective labor supply is endogenous in the second period of life. As an alternative to
human capital formation we could assume endogenous time allocation between work and leisure.
13Without loss of generality we assume that pensions are not taxed. If pensions were taxed, then b would be
replaced by an after-tax pension.
9section. It is important to notice that a link between past contributions and beneﬁts does not
imply a funded social security system. In this setting a funded system is equivalent to private
savings where the rate-of-return equals the market interest rate, while a PAYG system oﬀers




t consumption in period t by an individual living his or her period j,w h e r ej =1
for the young, j =2for the middle-aged and j =3for the elderly. Furthermore, denote savings
in the capital market of a member of age group j at the end of period t by S
j
t,a n dt h ea m o u n t
of land bought when being middle-aged by L2
t. Then individual savings used for land acquisition
is L2
tVt. As all land is purchased by the middle-aged, NtL2
t =1 . The value of land sold by old
people is given by L2
tVt+1, and land rent received in the third period of life is L2
tRt+1.
Note that with population growth, NtL2
t = Nt−1L3
t. Gt denotes the level of the pure public
good provided in period t.14 We assume a well-behaved utility function deﬁned over private and
public consumption. The individual lifetime utility maximization problem facing the members of















t+1,G t−1,G t,G t+1), (8)
subject to the budget constraints
14The labor tax rate, τw, is held constant throughout the analysis. However, public consumption, Gt,m a y































Notice that non-negativity of consumption and human capital investment implies that S1
t−1 < 0,
so that consumption and investment in human capital in the ﬁrst period is ﬁnanced by borrowing.
All individuals can save and borrow freely at the exogenous interest rate r, determined by the
international capital market, to smooth their consumption over their lifetime. Therefore, following
the Fisher Separation Theorem, optimal individual choices can be characterized by a two-step op-
timization problem: one where individuals choose educational investment to maximize discounted
net-of-tax lifetime income and a second one where, for a given lifetime income, individuals choose
their utility-maximizing intertemporal consumption proﬁle by borrowing and lending in the perfect




in the land market cancels out in the maximization of the net present value of lifetime income.






















15Thus, welfare gains of a transition to a fully-funded system cannot originate from capital market imperfections
as is the case, e.g., in Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001).
16To simplify the exposition, trade in land does not enter the maximization problem. This is justiﬁed by the fact
that land value is exogenous from each individual’s perspective and, thus, does not aﬀect educational investment.
Furthermore, given the Fisher Separation Theorem, the saving decision does not have to be made explicit when
analyzing optimal educational investment. It exclusively serves to implement the optimal life-cycle consumption
plan. The investment of savings in the international capital market and land market, in turn, follows from the
arbitrage condition (5).
11The ﬁr s tt e r mi nb r a c k e t si st h ep r i v a t ec o s to fe d u c a t i o n a li n v e s t m e n ti np e r i o dt − 1,t h e
second term is the after-tax wage income in period t discounted to period t−1, and the third term














t−1 wt =0 ,
which gives individually optimal educational investment in period t−1 as a function of wages.























Straightforward comparative statics yields:
∂b et−1(·)
∂τs
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
r>x
< 0.
The social security system discourages human capital investment if the rate of return under
t h eP A Y Gs y s t e mi sl o w e rt h a nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t e .T h er a t i o n a l ef o rt h i sd i s t o r t i o ni st h a tl e n d i n g
in the international capital market (as well as investment in the domestic land market) for one
period yields a rate of return r while compulsory savings under the PAYG system earn a rate






Therefore, the combined tax burden imposed by the wage tax and the implicit social security
tax reads τ := τw + τs r−x
1+r. Its magnitude determines the downward distortion in educational
12investment and the Harberger Triangle the economy incurs.
Balanced Growth Path
Human capital investment is independent of land price which gives Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 For any sequence of land prices {Vt}
∞
t=0 Eqs. (1), (2), (3), and (10) imply
ht
ht−1















1+q := (1 + g)
γ(1 + n)
αH(1−β)γ and γ :=
1
1 − αK − βαH
> 0. (13)
The growth rate of production, q, depends only on the parameters related to technological
progress, population growth and technology for production and human capital formation. It is
independent of the wage tax rate, social security contribution rate or interest rate, which aﬀect
only the level of production but not its growth rate. Given by Eq. (12), individual human capital
stock increases over time if g ≥ n,o ri fg is not much below n.I f g< <n ,t h e nht <h t−1 and
human capital stock per worker would decrease over time. However, even in such an economy
aggregate human capital and output would be still increasing.
Land price dynamics are captured by Eq. (5). Rearranging and using Lemma 1, all “price-

















0 > 1 if r>q . Lemma 2 summarizes
13the implications for the balanced growth path.
Lemma 2 Au n i q u eb a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t he x i s t si fa n do n l yi fr>q . The balanced growth path
exhibits point stability.
As illustrated in Figure 2, a unique balanced growth path ratio V ∗
R∗ exists if and only if φ
0 > 1
which exclusively holds if the interest rate exceeds the output growth rate, i.e. r>q .Ap o s i t i v e
and ﬁnite ratio of land price to land rent thus exists if the economy exhibits dynamic eﬃciency
(Homburg, 1991 and Rhee, 1991).17 As the economy is a price taker in the international capital
market and growth is exogenously driven, the requirement of dynamic eﬃciency is a necessary
and suﬃcient assumption for a balanced growth path to exist. The balanced growth path exhibits
point stability since for any value of Vt
Rt 6= V ∗
R∗,t h er a t i o Vt
Rt does not converge to V ∗
R∗. Therefore, the
only adjustment process consistent with perfect foresight is a jump to V ∗
R∗ in the period following
Vt
Rt 6= V ∗
R∗.





=( 1 + q) − 1.
In a purely earnings-related system the rate of return on contributions under the PAYG system
equals the economy’s growth rate q (Aaron, 1966). Following Eq. (11) and dynamic eﬃciency,
the earnings-related PAYG system imposes an implicit tax on contributions equal to τs r−q
1+r > 0.
Given the link between ct−1 and bt, only a fraction
r−q
1+r of the contribution rate τs is a tax.
17The result is not speciﬁc to a Cobb-Douglas production function. With a more general production technology
land continues to preclude dynamic ineﬃciency if land is essential, meaning that the income share of land does not
vanish asymptotically (Rhee, 1991).
14Figure 2: Steady State for r>q .
Using the land price equation (6) and the growth factor of land rents, the time path of land




.( 1 5 )
The factor (r − q)
−1 captures the eﬀect of future output growth and discounting on current
land value and is independent of the social security system. Any change in land value following a
security security reform in period t is captured by a jump in land rents in the subsequent period.
Finally, the ﬁnancial position of the country vis-a-vis the rest of the world must satisfy the
transversality condition. When the net foreign assets of the economy in period t are denoted





¢T Ft+T+1 =0(Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ,
1996).18 Here, the transversality condition is satisﬁe da st h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed for each
generation over its lifetime, and the growth rate of production as well as of land value is less than
the interest rate.
18As saving and investment in the following period’s capital stock takes place at the end of the period, it follows
that Ft = Nt+1S1
t + NtS2
t − Kt+1.
15II. Social Security Reform
We assume that social security tax rates are cut by proportion ω, ω ∈ [0,1],f r o mτs to
(1 − ω)τs. No reform occurs if ω =0whereas ω =1indicates a complete transition to a fully-
funded system. The policy reform is announced and implemented at the beginning of the period t∗
before the current younger generation has decided on educational investment and the elderly have
sold land to the middle-aged generation.19 As we analyze a small open economy, the transition to
a new steady-state takes place in two periods. The investment in human capital adjusts fully to
the path corresponding the new steady-state after the reform has been announced, implying that
the aggregate supply of labor services and the stock of physical capital adjust in the subsequent
period.20
Both the young and middle-aged beneﬁt from social security reform. While the middle-aged
only enjoy a lower implicit tax on their contributions, the young also reap the beneﬁts from less
distorted educational investments. The welfare eﬀects of the elderly are shaped by two conﬂicting
forces. On the one hand the elderly lose out due to the cut in social security beneﬁts. On the
other hand, they receive an unexpected wealth increase originating from a direct and indirect
eﬀect on educational investments. The reduced tax distortion directly increases human capital
investments of the current young and future young generations, which increases land rents in all
subsequent periods (starting in period t∗+1). Since production factors are complements, a higher
stock of human capital induces an inﬂow of physical capital and a complementary rise in the wage
rate. As an indirect eﬀect of the reduced tax distortion educational investments and land rents
increase even further. Following Eq. (15), higher land rents generate an immediate jump in land
19Important for our result is that land is owned by the elderly at the time of policy announcement and implemen-
tation, which implies that both capital gains and reduced pension beneﬁts accrue to current pensioners. Remarks
on alternative timings of policy reform are oﬀered in the Conclusion.
20In cases where distortions would arise from labor-leisure choice, instead of distorted investment in human
capital, production and land rents would adjust already in the period of reform announcement and implementation.
16Figure 3: Eﬀect of social security reform on Ht and Vt.
value accruing to land owners; see Figure 3 assuming equal slopes of Ht and Vt for expositional
simplicity. As the middle-aged have already made their investments in human capital, the value
of production and wage tax revenue in the period t∗ does not change, neither does the land rent
accruing to the elderly before they sell the land. Denoting the social security budget in period t
by Bt, Bt = τsαHYt, the social security reform is favored by the older generation if and only if the
increase in land value, ∆Vt∗, exceeds the drop in pension beneﬁts ∆Bt∗. Measuring the changes












z is the ratio between the gross rate of return oﬀered by the PAYG system and the gross rate of
return oﬀered by the ﬁnancial market. With dynamic eﬃciency (q<r ), z<1.T o u n d e r s t a n d
17Proposition 1 and 2 it is helpful to note that z depends on the output growth rate q and the
interest rate r both being exogenous. Any value z<1 c a nb ea c h i e v e db yc h o o s i n gas u ﬃciently
high value of r. Proposition 1 presents the main ﬁnding of the paper.
Proposition 1 Consider a social security reform where τs is marginally reduced. For any values
0 <α H,α K,αH + αK < 1 and 0 <τ s,τw < 1, as u ﬃciently high value of z, 0 <z<1, and an
induced value of β
∗(z), 0 <β
∗(z) < 1, always exists for which the reduction in beneﬁts equals
t h ei n c r e a s ei nl a n dv a l u e . L e tt h es e to fz-values which induce a β
∗(z) be denoted by Γ (which
is always non-empty). For all combinations of z ∈ Γ and β, β
∗(z) <β<1, the social security
reform is intergenerationally Pareto-improving.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
A Pareto-improving reform with intergenerational trade is feasible. To illustrate Proposition 1
thoroughly, Figure 4 displays β
∗(z) and the set Γ for three parameter combinations which involve
av a r y i n gτw. If for the sake of illustration τw =0 .5, the set Γ =( 0 .38,1). It is only for these
z-values that a β-value < 1 exists which in combination with the corresponding z-value satisﬁes
condition (16) as an equality. Given z ∈ (0.38,1) an intergenerational Pareto-improvement holds
for all β>β
∗(z) as a higher elasticity of human capital supply magniﬁes the eﬃciency gains of
the pension reform. The most stringent requirement of Proposition 1 is that the general wage tax
must be strictly positive. The intuition is straightforward. The wage tax adds to the ineﬃciency
in educational investment due to the implicit tax rate in the PAYG system. The distortion in
educational investment is convex in the overall tax rate. Therefore, the eﬃciency gain of a pension
reform increases over-proportionally as the initially prevailing overall tax rate rises. Figure 4
readily reveals that τw is critical not only qualitatively but also quantitatively.
Proposition 1 requires that z be suﬃciently high, i.e. the rate of return oﬀered in the PAYG
18Figure 4: β
∗(z) for varying values of τw (αK =0 .2, αH =0 .6,a n dτs =0 .2)
system and the fully-funded system must be suﬃciently aligned. This is a surprising ﬁnding, as it
implies that a reduction in the population growth rate (lower q and thus lower z), and therefore an
increase in the dependency ratio, would actually reduce the scope for a Pareto-improving reduction
in the social security tax rate. On the other hand, reduced population growth rate may undermine
the sustainability of a PAYG system since the dependency ratio goes up. Therefore, there seems
to be a conﬂict between the implications of the demographic structure for the potential for Pareto
improvements and for the sustainability of the system. The ﬁndings can be reconciled by noting
that the implicit tax rate increases as z reduces, but at the same time the future productivity
eﬀects are discounted more strongly (Eq. (15)). The latter eﬀect dominates which diminishes the
scope of the asset price eﬀects to compensate the elderly.
In this framework demographic change aﬀects asset prices in a diﬀerent way to that which
previous literature has focused on. Therein the higher rate of return under a fully-funded system
might partially be eroded by population aging since future pensioners have to sell ﬁnancial assets
to a smaller generation of young investors when liquidating their portfolios; see Abel (2001) and
Poterba (2001) for a critical evaluation of the “meltdown” hypothesis. In the present paper,
19equilibrium land price in each period is not directly aﬀected by a change in the ratio of the
number of suppliers to demanders. Instead, negative demographic shocks reduce asset returns due
to lower steady state growth which immediately capitalizes in asset prices.
Proposition 2 presents comparative static results.
Proposition 2 (i) β
∗(z) is decreasing in z, z ∈ Γ.
(ii) The inﬁmum of Γ is increasing in αK and decreasing in αH and τw.F u r t h e r m o r e ,k e e p i n g
z, z ∈ Γ, constant, β
∗(z) is increasing in αK and decreasing in αH and τw.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Part (i) reveals that z and β can be imperfectly substituted in order to sustain a Pareto-
improvement. Higher discounting of future productivity gains is neutralized by a higher elasticity
of human capital investment which magniﬁes the response of educational investment to a reduction
in the implicit tax rate. The range of z-values and the critical level β
∗(z) are inﬂuenced by the
speciﬁcs of the economy.
It is a priori unclear how a change in αK and αH should be expected to aﬀect the inﬁmum of
Γ.T h e ﬁrst eﬀect is that an increase in either of them shrinks the income share of land, which
would suggest that the inﬁmum of Γ should increase: As productivity increases accrue to a lower
extent to land, it is reasonable to expect that this requires a lower discount rate z to keep the
asset price adjustment at the same order of magnitude. The second eﬀect is that an increase in
either αK or αH increases the responsiveness of total production to changes in the factor whose
share increases, which would suggest that the inﬁmum of Γ should decrease. We ﬁnd that for an
increase in αK,t h eﬁrst eﬀect dominates, while for αH, the second one is more important. This
is in line with changes in adjustable physical capital stock being indirect eﬀects, while changes in
20the stock of human capital are direct eﬀects, magniﬁed by indirectly induced eﬀects of physical
capital. A higher wage tax magniﬁes the distortions in educational investment which are partially
eliminated by the pension reform. Discounting of productivity eﬀects can thus be more severe,
i.e. a lower value of z, and still allow for a Pareto-improvement. Applying an analogous line of
argument the threshold β
∗(z) responds similarly to the considered parameter changes as a change
in z does.
At this point it is informative to relate Propositions 1 and 2 to the literature on PAYG reform
using public debt to compensate the elderly. In an earnings-related PAYG system the issuance of
public debt does not yield a Pareto-improvement irrespective of the pre-existing level of general
wage taxation; see Fenge (1995). Intuitively, the reduction in the implicit tax rate is neutralized
by the increase in the wage tax necessary to service the public debt. With intergenerational trade
in land, however, a lower implicit tax rate does not require adjustments in the explicit tax rate
levied on future generations. The eﬃciency gain is permanent and a fraction of it capitalizes in
the land price. The capitalization mechanism can be interpreted as an intergenerational transfer
institution which transfers part of the future eﬃciency gains to the elderly in a lump-sum fashion.
Finally, we should notice that there is a further welfare gain from increased future public
expenditures, see Eq. (8). As the general wage tax rate is kept constant, increased human capital
production implies increased wage tax revenue as a result of a decreasing social security tax rate. If
instead the revenue requirement for public expenditures were to stay constant, the implied future
decrease in general wage taxation would further boost human capital investment and land value
in the period a reform is announced. Additionally, private consumption would increase following
a reduction in the tax burden.
I I I .T h eR i s ea n dF a l lo ft h eP A Y GS y s t e m
21Our analysis in the previous section raises a legitimate question: If the elimination of a PAYG
system could be a Pareto improvement, why would such a system exist? It is not plausible that
a PAYG system would have been implemented in the ﬁrst place if it did not beneﬁt the older
generation at that time. The creation of a PAYG system could be explained, outside our model,
by arguments such as the inability of the poor to save for their retirement in the 19th century.
However, even our basic model captures some obvious candidates for why the PAYG system could
have beneﬁt e dt h ee l d e r l yi nt h eﬁrst place, but lost its appeal subsequently. One such candidate
is unequal distribution of land ownership. The poor, older citizens without assets would favor a
PAYG system, as they are not hurt by the eﬃciency loss capitalized in land value. Therefore, an
increasing middle-class with widespread stock ownership might contribute to the eroded popularity
of the PAYG system among the elderly. Another obvious candidate is the secular increase in other
public expenditures. An increased tax burden implies higher distortions, and increases the cost
of maintaining a PAYG system. As the increase in the welfare state during the 20th century was
not anticipated when the social security system was introduced, the elderly could have supported
its introduction then, but now beneﬁt from its abolition even if nothing other than the general
wage tax rate has changed. We summarize this argument as
Proposition 3 If the elderly are indiﬀerent between τs and (1 − ω)τs, ω>0,w i t hag i v e nw a g e
tax rate e τ
w, then they would strictly prefer (1 − ω)τs with all τw > e τ
w.
Proof. The elderly being indiﬀerent to a reduction of social security tax rate by ωτs,ω>0,
implies that θ>0, as otherwise the elderly would always strictly prefer a higher social security
tax rate. With wage tax rate e τ
w,
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22Diﬀerentiation of the left-hand side with respect to τw yields




(1 − τs(1 − ω)(1 − z) − τw)
(1 − τs(1 − z) − τw)
¶γβαH−1 τsω(1 − z)
(1 − τs(1 − z) − τw)2.
As this is positive with any ω>0,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h ew a g et a xr a t ei ss u ﬃcient to induce the
elderly to favor a cut in the social security tax rate.
As a corollary, Proposition 3 implies:
Corollary 1 I ft h ee l d e r l ya r ec u r r e n t l yi n d i ﬀerent between maintaining the current social security
system or eliminating it, they would have favored its establishment with any given lower level of
wage tax rate.
The proposed explanation for the growing concern for social security reform is supported by
the steady increase in the labor tax rates (besides other taxes) in major industrialized countries
over the second half of the 20th century; see Mendoza et al. (1994).21 Daveri and Tabellini
(2000) provide empirical evidence that this increase in tax ratios has lowered economic growth
and, therefore, the rate of return oﬀered by a PAYG system which further undermines its ﬁscal
attractiveness. Undoubtedly, the explanation will not exclusively account for the intended or
already implemented reforms in a variety of countries, but it will nevertheless complement other
forces such as population aging.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate that the scope for Pareto improvements in social security systems
is wider than previous literature suggests. In earlier literature, the Pareto improvements in PAYG
21For instance, the macroeconomic U.S. labor income tax rate rose from roughly 18 percent in 1965 to 29 percent
in 1988. Over the same time span, labor income tax rates steadily increased from 15 to 26 percent in Japan, from
20 to nearly 27 percent in the U.K., from almost 13 to 28 percent in Canada, and from 30 to 41 percent in Germany
(only West Germany); see Figure 2 in Mendoza et al. (1994).
23systems rely on externalities or intragenerational redistribution; neither being inherently related
to a PAYG system. Both absent, we show that a Pareto-improving transition is still feasible in
an economy with a ﬁxed factor of production, here labeled as land. As land value captures future
land rents, intergenerational trade in land allows the pensioners of the transition generation to
participate in the beneﬁts of reducing the social security tax rate. We also provide an explanation
for why the PAYG system may have lost its appeal even for pensioners after its introduction.
Even if a decrease in social security beneﬁts were to result in a larger capital gain in land
value in the aggregate level, such reduction need not be Pareto-improving alone. If land is not
fully owned by domestic pensioners, then capital gains taxation may be needed to implement a
Pareto-improvement. The government could ﬁnance social security beneﬁts for the elderly of the
transition period by unexpectedly taxing capital gains resulting from the reduction in the social
security tax rate. Demand for capital gains taxation also arises if the social security reform is
announced prior to its implementation. Otherwise, beneﬁts and costs of the reform accrue to
diﬀerent generations.
There are important caveats when drawing policy implications. The simulations are suggestive
and are not meant to be calibrated to a speciﬁc economy. Thus, the results are of a theoretical
nature. The compensation mechanism that we identify may, nonetheless, constitute a part of a
partial social security reform. A policy-oriented analysis should calibrate the factor shares of
ﬁxed and adjustable physical capital, as well as the production function for human capital. As the
eﬀects of the PAYG system may depend crucially on other taxes, it would be desirable to replicate
the essential features of the tax system in numerical analysis. This exercise, as well as modeling
asset price eﬀects through a revaluation of existing physical capital (as common in tax reform
analysis; see e.g. Altig et al., 2001) is left to future research. Applied to social security reform, the
last extension is likely to strengthen our ﬁndings since it opens up an additional intergenerational
24link through which the current elderly have a stake in future productivity gains.
Appendix A1: Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Population
In this appendix, we analyze the conditions under which the results from Section II hold in
an economy in which people diﬀer in their ability and in their asset ownership. Let us divide the
working population in period t into I groups (i =1 ,..,I), so that individuals in any group (t,i)
share the same ability and asset ownership characteristics. We deﬁne ability as individual ability
to absorb and eﬀectively utilize investment in human capital. A member of group (t,i) being a





in which et−1,i is investment in human capital in period t − 1 by individuals belonging to the
ability group (t,i).T o r e ﬂect the empirical fact that workers belonging to high-income groups
often have more expensive education, we assume that the cost of creating human capital stock
at,ie
β
t−1,i equals at,iet−1,i. The number of workers belonging to the ability class (t,i) is nt,i.W e
normalize the measure of ability so that the average ability is unity in each period, implying
that
P





the individual maximization problem (9) and solving the ﬁrst-order conditions for diﬀerent ability
classes i yields identical investments in human capital b et−1,i. Through adopting this normalization,
this translates into an aggregate stock of human capital in the economy and factor prices both of
which are identical to the case without heterogeneity.
What remains to be analyzed are the welfare eﬀects of a social security reform for diﬀerent
ability classes. Subsequently, we denote the share of domestically-owned land held in period t by
the elderly members of the ability class (t − 1,i) by ψt−1,i. Corresponding to Section II, we can









> 0,( 1 7 )
in which
nt−1,iat−1,i
Nt−1 denotes the share of social security beneﬁts belonging to ability class
(t − 1,i).I f
nt−1,iat−1,i
Nt−1 = ψt−1,i, the results from Section II can be generalized to an economy
with a heterogeneous population. In this case, land ownership is distributed in the same way as
wage income and, importantly, social security beneﬁts.







which is the ratio of the share of land owned by the members of ability class (t − 1,i) to its share
of wage income in period t − 1, which is again equal to its share of social security beneﬁts in
period t. Let us denote the minimum value of these ratios in period t by λt−1. If all land is owned
domestically and asset ownership is perfectly correlated with wage income, then λt−1 =1 .I fl a n d
ownership were to be distributed either less or more equally than wage income and entitlement
to social security beneﬁts, then this disparity would reduce scope for a Pareto-improvement in
the absence of capital gains taxation above the normal rate of return on ﬁxed asset holdings. For
instance, starting at the parameter baseline, the critical value for λt−1 becomes ≈ 0.96.22 Dispar-
ity is not allowed to be too large in order to achieve a Pareto-improvement for each ability class.
If λt−1 drops below the threshold level, there is demand for capital gains taxation in order to
redistribute the aggregate increments in land value (exceeding the reduction in the social security
budget) intragenerationally to achieve Pareto-improvement for all households.
Appendix A2: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
22Increased popularity of deﬁned contribution plans, as documented by Poterba et al. (2001), has probably
increased the value of λ among those retirees participating.
26P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
T h ec h a n g ei nb e n e ﬁts relative to GDP is
∆Bt(·)
Yt = −ωτsαH and the change in land valuation
relative to GDP is
∆Vt(·)
Yt
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1 − τs(1 − z) − τw, (20)
where z :=
1+q
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> 0. (21)
Inserting Eqs. (19) and (20) into condition (21), using γ := 1
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1 − τs(1 − z) − τw > 1. (22)
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z
1 − τs(1 − z) − τw > 1. (23)




1 − αH − αK
1 − αK − β
∗(z)αH
z
1 − τs(1 − z) − τw =1 . (24)
Denote the set of z-values which induce β
∗(z) ∈ (0,1) by Γ which is non-empty by the limes
(23). Given by Eq. (22), for all values z ∈ Γ and β ∈ (β
∗(z),1) the social security reform is
Pareto-improving.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
(i) Since β
1−αH−αK
1−αK−βαH is strictly increasing in β and z
1−τs(1−z)−τw is strictly increasing in z, β
∗(z),
28deﬁned by Eq. (24), is downward-sloping.
(ii) z
1−τs(1−z)−τw is strictly increasing in z.F u r t h e r m o r e , β
1−αH−αK
1−αK−βαH is strictly decreasing in
αK and strictly increasing in αH. Now, choose the inﬁmum of Γ denoted zinf. Using Eq. (24),
zinf rises (falls) in response to a higher value of αK (αH). Now, keep z, z ∈ Γ, constant. The
corresponding level of β
∗(z) is increasing in αK and decreasing in αH and τw. The latter results
from the fact that z
1−τs(1−z)−τw is strictly increasing in τw.
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